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1 Introduction
The welfare state has been extending its action from mere monetary transfers for
poverty reduction to wider programmes, such as providing basic social goods (educa-
tion and health) and income substitution programmes, such as pensions, with a high
insurance component. Interestingly, in a way, this process leads to the gradual sub-
stitution of private intergenerational transfers from the public sphere. Government
intervention in this case goes beyond intra-generational redistribution, introducing in-
tergenerational redistribution. In fact, two of the most important policies are public
education and pensions, which focus directly on both sides of dependency (children
and the elderly). In particular, the size of public pensions in OECD countries in 2010
was on average 7.3% of GDP and expenditure on public education was on average
5.6% of GDP.
Parallel to this, population ageing is becoming an issue of increasing concern,
especially as the generations of “baby boomers” reach retirement age, putting consid-
erable pressure on current pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems. More specifically,
in 2010 the old age dependency ratio for the average of OECD countries was 22.4%
and is expected to be 43.4% by 2040. The driving forces behind population ageing are
the decreased fertility rate - preceded by the post-war “baby boom” - and increased
life expectancy. Among other things, the latter is a result of better-quality services
due to technological progress in the healthcare system. The former can be seen as
a result of the increasing opportunity cost for women to have children in developed
economies.1.
The literature on intergenerational transfers has experienced considerable devel-
opment due to the demographic transition. Demographic variables interact with
economic variables, becoming endogenous to the economic system. The nature and
magnitude of this link depend on the behavioural norms and expectations within
societies and families regarding transfers to/from other generations. Therefore, the
investigation of intergenerational transfers implies considering, more or less explicitly,
hypotheses about the motives for private transfers and government intervention. The
transfer motives might go from forward and backward altruism to strategic behaviour
or, following the recent literature on endogenous preferences, they can be due to reci-
procity.2 Nevertheless, even on using micro data, it is very difficult to identify these
1In Galor and Weil (1996), this is forced by a higher increase in female wages with respect to household income.
Other potential channels are the increase in human capital investment per child and the quantity-quality trade-off a`
la Becker [Becker et al. (1990); Galor and Weil (2000)]
2Michel et al. (2006) for a survey on forward and backward altruism in the context of neoclassical growth models;
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motives. The political economy literature is not an exception to this trend. More im-
portantly, this literature somehow converges with the literature on intergenerational
transfers by investigating the link between forward and backward intergenerational
transfers in the absence of altruism. This link is quite intuitively present in the family
but not necessarily in government action.
In the framework of a representative democracy and in the absence of intergener-
ational altruism, governments try to maximize political support. In order to do so,
their policies are shaped by the desire of the majority of voters. This majority mainly
consists of middle-aged workers and pensioners who might favour policies such as
public pensions rather than public education, through a more generous reallocation
of funds towards the elderly than towards the young. This prediction is well known
in the literature as “generational conflict” or “elderly power” hypothesis, and it is
especially reinforced under population ageing. In contrast to this hypothesis the ”fis-
cal leakage” hypothesis predicts that population ageing exerts strong fiscal pressure
on the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system inducing working-age voters to favour
smaller pensions.
However, when we consider both pensions and education programmes simultane-
ously, other mechanisms may arise. More specifically, the structure of the PAYG
pension system, combined with the demographic transition, creates incentives to in-
vest in public education. Higher spending on public education ”today” can improve
the productivity and consequently the wages of the workers that will pay for the pen-
sions ”tomorrow”. Hence, the working-age generation, foreseeing the benefits from
the contribution rates of future workers, has an appreciable incentive to invest in
the education of the young generation. Therefore, the design of the PAYG pension
system creates a link between public education and public pensions. According to
our findings, this link is enhanced when there is a projected worsening of population
ageing in the future.
In this paper, our main goal is to examine the effect of population ageing on pub-
lic education, public pensions and the potential link between these public policies.
First, regarding public pensions, the impact of an increasing share of elderly people
has a non-linear effect on individual retirement benefits. This suggests that politi-
cal pressure to increase benefits turns out to have no effect when the ageing process
is strong enough to compromise the fiscal budget. Second, population ageing ap-
pears to be negatively related to education expenditure, indicating a certain degree
Laferrere and Wolff (2006) for a survey on the motives for private transfers; and Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a detailed
survey on altruism and endogenous preferences (others regarding preferences).
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of generational conflict. However, it seems that the impact of population ageing on
public education spending depends on the level of retirement spending. Third, we
present empirical evidence in favour of the link between pensions and education. More
specifically, we suggest that, considering the projected population ageing, the struc-
ture of the PAYG pension system provides incentives to the working-age generation
to support educational transfers towards the young generation even in the absence
of altruism. Finally, by decomposing total education spending by level of education,
we can see that only the non-mandatory educational levels benefit from the future
population ageing, probably because there is space for government intervention to
enhance labour productivity.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we pro-
vide an overview of the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the political
economy of social security (pensions) and education spending and on the link between
these programmes. In the third section, we examine the effect of population ageing on
public pensions. The fourth section is devoted to an investigation of the link between
pension and education spending and to an examination of the ”generational conflict”
hypothesis. Also, in the same section we investigate the effect of the projected old
dependency ratio on education expenditure by level of education. Finally, in the last
section we provide our conclusions and suggest some issues for future research.
2 Literature Review
The first part of our literature review regards the theoretical literature on the political
economy of social security, which is quite considerable. Breyer (1994) and Galasso and
Profeta (2002) provide good reviews of this literature. According to the literature, the
ageing process affects the social security system through two opposing channels. On
the one hand, there is the aforementioned “fiscal leakage” hypothesis, which suggests
that the increased proportion of elderly people decreases the expected profitability of
pay-as-you-go pension systems for current working-age voters, thereby inducing them
to favour lower current pensions. Therefore, the working-age generation repudiates
the social security system [Breyer and Stolte (2001); Razin et al. (2002); Razin and
Sadka (2007)]. On the other hand, population ageing makes the median voter older
and hence more inclined to support higher expenses on pensions, the well-known
in the literature “political power of elderly” hypothesis [Browning (1975); Mulligan
and Sala-i Martin (1999); Persson and Tabellini (2000)]. Alternatively, Castles 2004)
argues that the higher total spending on pensions is attributed to the design and
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some specific characteristics of the social security system rather than to population
ageing.3 However, Castles admits that the cuts in pensions are negatively correlated
with an increased political clout of the elderly.
Browning (1975) is the first to argue that increasing social security spending is due
to political factors related to the age of the median voter. He considers an economy
without capital markets where the pension system is the only capital investment.
The demographic transition makes the median voter older and more willing to support
higher benefits through higher contributions, resulting in an overspending (”above the
long-run welfare maximizing level”). Boadway and Wildasin (1989), in an overlapping
generation (OLG) framework of continuous-time, apply a median voter model with
constrained capital market and stricter institutional and behavioural assumptions
reaching almost the same conclusions. These early models assume static expectations
as a way of commitment to past decisions and infrequent elections.
Later on, in a theoretical model with endogenous labour supply Breyer and Stolte
(2001) find opposite results to the prediction of median voter. In particular, they show
that the demographic transition leads to an increase in political power of the elderly
who, in the belief of a further drop in the fertility rate, impose a higher labour income
tax. However, because of the endogenous labour supply, the working generation reacts
by decreasing the level of labour, leading to a decrease in the benefits that the retirees
enjoy. Thus, equilibrium is characterized by higher contributions per capita but less
total benefits. A similar result in relation to pension benefits is found by Razin
et al. (2002) in the model with heterogeneous agents (skilled and unskilled).4 The
authors show theoretically and empirically that the ageing of the population leads to
a political equilibrium with lower taxes or lower benefits. In contrast, Shelton (2008),
by using the old dependency ratio instead of the total dependency ratio, replicates the
regressions of Razin et al. (2002) and obtains the opposite results.5 In addition, Disney
(2007) challenges the main idea and the empirical findings of Razin et al. (2002), by
arguing that their model is misspecified and the results are biased. Other empirical
studies, Breyer and Craig (1997) and Hollanders and Koster (2012), notice that the
size of the pension system increases with the age of the median voter6. However, both
fail to support the hypothesis of increased political clout of the elderly translated into
higher benefits per retiree. Alternatively, using the old dependency ratio Mulligan and
3He examines 21 OECD countries over the period 1980-1998.
4This welfare state model is extended by Razin and Sadka (2007), who reach the same conclusions.
5The old dependency ratio is the ratio of population over 65 to the working-age (15-64) population. The total
dependency ratio also includes the young-age (0-14) population in the numerator.
6 Hollanders and Koster (2012), using the median age of the whole population as proxy for median age of the
electorate.
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Sala-i Martin (1999), Tabellini (2000), Disney (2007) and Tepe and Vanhuysse (2009)
reach the same conclusion of a positive relationship with pensions, considering the
size of the pension system rather than individual pensions.7 However, Lindert (1996)
argues that the effect of the old dependency ratio on both the size and the generosity
of the system is non-linear. When the old dependency ratio is low, the relationship
with pension spending is positive but, as the ratio increases over the years, after a
certain point the sign of the relationship becomes negative. As Lindert highlights,
this point is lower for individual spending than for total spending on pensions. In
addition, Tepe and Vanhuysse (2009) and Razin et al. (2002) find negative effects
of the old dependency ratio when they consider the benefits per retiree. Finally, the
estimations of Shelton (2008) provide weak support for the hypothesis of the “political
power of elderly”.
The second part of the literature discussion regards the political economy of public
education, where many studies test the so-called “generational conflict” hypothesis.
The intuition behind this hypothesis is simple. The old population has different
preferences in comparison with the younger population and therefore they demand
different allocations of public resources. In his studies, Poterba (1997,8) argues that,
in the case of the US, the effect of gerontocracy on education outlays per child is
negative. In addition, according to the author, the growing number of schoolchildren
depresses the expenditure per child of primary and secondary education. The latter
empirical result finds support in the study by Fernandez and Rogerson (1997), who
use panel data for the US in order to examine the effect of enrolments on per-student
spending.8 Nonetheless, Ladd and Murray (2001) contest the approach of Poterba
(1997) by suggesting that the use of local government instead of state-level data
weakens the negative effect of the share of the elderly on per-student education or
even makes it insignificant. Later on, Grob and Wolter (2007) use state-level data for
the Swiss Cantons for the period (1990-2002).9 Considering only primary and lower
secondary education, the authors find that both the number of pupils and the share
of retirees have a negative effect on per-student spending. A subsequent study by
Borge and Rattso (2008), using panel data for local governments in Denmark, finds
evidence in favour of the “generational conflict” hypothesis.
In contrast, Kemnitz (2000), in a context of a small open economy OLG model,
shows the potential benefits of population ageing on education and pension spending
levels. According to him, the reduced fertility rate itself has a positive impact on edu-
7Tabellini (2000) uses the proportion of old people (65+) in the population instead of the old dependency ratio.
8They use data on primary and secondary education spending.
9In this case the local government data were unavailable.
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cation spending per student without increasing the budget constraint. Generally, the
demographic transition achieves a better backward (pensions) and forward (educa-
tion) redistribution of public funds. The main result of his study is that the structure
of the PAYG pension system stimulates investments in education that provide future
benefits for the currently working generation. Gradstein and Kaganovich (2004) reach
similar conclusions, having a slightly different intuition. According to their model, as
the old population grows there should be two antithetical effects on public education
expenditure. On the one hand, there is a growing number of retirees who want to
minimize the amount spent on education. On the other hand, there are working-age
agents who anticipate two facts. First, they foresee that they are going to live longer
because of the increase in longevity. Second, they realize that the increased number
of retirees makes the pay-as-you-go system less generous in terms of spending per
retiree. Having anticipated these facts, they will react by investing more in education
in the current period in order to take advantage of the future higher productivity of
currently young people. In this way, they pursue an increase in future tax revenues
and endeavour to ensure a higher return on their savings in order to deal with the
increased fiscal needs of a prolonged retirement period. The authors find that, even
in the absence of altruistic linkages, the second effect is stronger and therefore the
ageing process has a positive impact on the amount spent on education.10 As we will
discuss below, we find empirical evidence in favour of the second effect.
The last part of our overview of the literature considers the link between public
education and pension spending more explicitly. Back in the late seventies, scholars
already argued in favour of the existence of the link between forward and backward
public intergenerational transfers by answering the question why selfish generations
choose to transfer resources to future generations.11 Pogue and Sgontz (1977) ar-
gue that the design of the PAYG pension system creates the appropriate incentives
to invest in public education because it enhances the income of the future working
generation. Following the same argument, Konrad (1995) explains that, even in the
absence of altruism, the working-class generations are willing to pay for public educa-
tion only if they can ”reap” gains by taxing the results of the higher productivity in
the future. In the framework of the OLG model, in which human and physical capi-
10In contrast, Poutvaara (2006), using a model with heterogeneous productivity, suggests that the ageing of the
population is expected to have a negative effect on public education spending as the political electorate of retirees
rises.
11Independently from the link, Sala-i Martin (1995), in his positive theory of social security, argues that the social
security exists to buy out the less productive old workers and eliminate the negative effect that they have on the
productivity of others by replacing them with more productive young people in order to achieve higher aggregate
output.
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tal are both used in production, Boldrin (1992) provides a slightly different intuition.
The decision to invest in education reflects positively on physical capital productivity
because of its complementarity with human capital productivity. This in turn en-
hances the future return on savings and therefore offers higher future income to the
current working-age generation.
In more recent years, adopting a game theoretical framework in their study of
social security, Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) contend that working-age generations
have incentives to tax income and finance pensions because, in this way, they can
affect their total income upwards through future returns on savings. Also, the game
theoretical framework is used a few years later by Rangel (2003) in order to study the
possibility of sustaining a system of public forward and backward intergenerational
transfers. He uses the concept of a sub-game perfect equilibrium in order to investi-
gate, in the context of selfish generations, the ability of non-market intergenerational
arrangements to invest optimally in forward and backward transfers. With the help
of simple trigger strategies (STS) in a repeated voting setting, he concludes that the
provision of education for the younger generation is optimal and sustained only when
it is linked to sufficiently large transfers to the older generation. Along the same lines
as the previous paper but in a different framework, Boldrin and Montes (2005) stress
the link between public education and pensions. In the presence of credit constraints
to finance education, financing only public education is not sufficient to restore effi-
ciency because in order to do so an additional intergenerational trade arrangement is
needed.
3 Public Pensions and Population Ageing
In this section of the paper, our investigation is focused on the determinants of the
size (as a percentage of GDP) and generosity (expenditure per retiree) of the public
pension system and how they are affected by demographic transition.
3.1 Data
In line with the previous literature, we identify and use four main categories of vari-
ables.12 Furthermore, we conduct a panel data analysis for 23 OECD countries13
over the period 1980-2010. We use intervals of five years for the period instead of 1
12 Definitions and sources of the variables can be found in Table 11 in the Appendix.
13Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., U.S.
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year in order to capture the political cycle in which pension reforms and changes in
demographic structure usually take place.14
[Insert Table 1]
In Table 1, we show some descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis.
As we can see, the first and the second variables capture the total amount of retirement
spending measured as a percentage of GDP (RST) and retirement spending per retiree
(RSPR), respectively. As we can observe from Table 1, the overall differences between
countries and years are 2.34 % of GDP for total retirement spending and $5650 for
retirement spending per retiree. Regarding the former variable, the differences across
countries are higher than the differences in the countries over years. However, in the
case of the latter variable, the cross-country differences are smaller than the differences
in countries over the years.15
The Old Dependency Ratio (ODR) is the population over 65 years old as a pro-
portion of working-age population. This variable is a proxy for the number of retired
people. It is expected that the retirees will claim a higher level of pensions through
their voting power which is increasing. However, at the same time, the ageing process
makes the PAYG pension system less generous towards retirees. Although the old
dependency ratio is a good proxy for the political power of old people, it might not
cover the real power of the elderly because it takes into account only the old people
who are at retirement age (active pensioners). In order to capture all the people that
might have an interest in claiming more generous pensions (or at least not pushing
for cuts in pensions), we employ an additional proxy for the power of the elderly,
the ratio of people above 55 years old over the working-age population that repre-
sents working-age people close to retirement age. Moreover, we incorporate into our
model a variable that represents the future old dependency ratio. Specifically, we use
the projected old dependency ratio in 30 years (2011-2031) in order to capture the
reaction of the current political and economic system to the projected ageing process.
Furthermore, we include some macroeconomic and labour control variables: GDP
per capita, real GDP growth rate, long-term interest rate on government bonds and
unemployment rate. The first two represent the level of economic development and
its growth. The interest rate shows us the borrowing cost in order to finance social
policies like the PAYG pension system. Finally, the unemployment rate represents
14In contrast with studies by Breyer and Craig (1997) and Tepe and Vanhuysse (2009) who use 10 and 8 years,
respectively. In addition, the former use a random effects estimator and the latter use a fixed effects estimator.
15See Table 10 in the Appendix.
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the percentage of people that do not contribute to the pension system because they
are out of work. Also, we control for the openness of the economy, measured as total
trade (sum of imports and exports) as a percentage of GDP. According to the “race
to the bottom” hypothesis (Castles, 2004), governments reduce taxes and therefore
pension outlays because they are translated into higher wage costs in order to become
more competitive in exports. In addition, the trade union density is included and
corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members,
divided by the total number of wage and salary earners. The trade unions assert
higher pensions for their members, which would normally push up the pension cost.
Last but not least, we incorporate two qualitative variables as political controls,
the type of government and the government party (or government ideology). The
former is a variable that takes values that represent five different types of government
starting from the strongest type (=1, single party majority) to the weakest type
(=5, multi-party minority). The latter represents the ideological spectrum of the
government cabinet (also known as Schmidt-Index) and goes from the hegemony of
right-wing and centre parties (=1) to the hegemony of social-democratic and other
left-wing parties (=5).
3.2 Methodological Approach
In order to estimate the effect of the demographic transition on retirement spending,
we use the time fixed effects approach. Apart from the fact that in the particular
empirical literature there is a consensus to use the fixed effects (FE) model, our
intuition is that, given our data (23 OECD countries), the unobserved country specific
characteristics - like tradition or the level of social altruism towards the elderly -
might be correlated with the current and projected old dependency ratio (independent
variables) and that may affect the level of retirement spending (dependent variable),
making the OLS estimator both biased and inconsistent. Using FE, we deal with
the large source of omitted variable bias by controlling the cross-country unobserved
heterogeneity. An additional reason comes from the theoretical perspective. In order
to explain how the electoral outcomes change spending on pensions, we need to exploit
the within-countries (over-time) variation of the demographic variables rather than
the between or cross-countries variation, considering the time-invariant unobserved
differences between countries as fixed rather than random.
The empirical reasons behind the decision to use FE are derived from the di-
agnostic tests. More specifically, we conduct two tests introduced by Breusch and
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Pagan (1980) and Hausman (1978) that lead us to choose the FE specification.16
The former test reveals that there is variance of country-specific characteristics in
our panel model and therefore we cannot use the pooled OLS estimator because it
is inconsistent, as mentioned above. The latter test demonstrates that the correla-
tion between the error term and the control variables is non-zero and, therefore, the
main assumption in order to obtain a consistent random effects estimator is violated.
Furthermore, we conduct additional diagnostic tests in order to investigate whether
there is a correlation of idiosyncratic error terms across countries (cross-sectional de-
pendence), within countries (auto-correlation) and whether the variance of the error
terms is non-constant (heteroscedasticity).17 These tests demonstrate that our errors
are heteroscedastic but they are not serially or cross-sectionally correlated. By using
heteroscedastic-robust (also known as Huber/White) standard errors, we overcome
the problem of heteroscedasticity (biased standard errors).
Therefore, with the help of FE, we remove the effects of the time-invariant char-
acteristics that exist across countries, and we can therefore obtain the net effect of
the determinants on the dependent variables. Our baseline model is constructed as a
synthesis of the previous studies [Tepe and Vanhuysse (2009); Hollanders and Koster
(2012)].
Yi,t = c+ β1Di,t +
4∑
k=1
γkM
k
i,t +
2∑
m=1
δmL
m
i,t +
2∑
n=1
ζnP
n
i,t +
6∑
t=1
λtIt + αi + i,t
where i=1. . . 23, t=1,. . . 6. The dependent variable Y is the total pension spending as
% of GDP (RST) or pension benefits per retiree (RSPR). First, our main focus is on
the demographic variables (D): current old dependency ratio (ODR) or projected old
dependency ratio (PRODR) or the ratio of the population above 55 years old over the
working-age population. We chose these demographic variables in order to test the
“elderly power” and the “fiscal leakage” hypotheses. Second, we include as control
variables four macroeconomic indicators (M): GDP per capita (GDPpc), real GDP
growth (RGDPgr), interest rate (Intrate) and trade openness (Openc). Third, we add
two variables related to the labour market (L): unemployment (Unemp) and union
density (Un.Den.). Fourth, we include political variables (P): type of government
(G.T.) and government party (G.P.). In addition, in order to fit a two-way FE model,
we create time periods (I) and include all of them but one (the first period, 1980).
16The test for time fixed effects indicates the necessity of using the time periods as dummy variables in our model
specification.
17We implement Frees (1995) and Pesaran (2004) tests for cross-sectional dependence, Lagrange-Multiplier test for
serial correlation, also known as Wooldridge test for autocorrelation Wooldridge (2002), and modified Wald test for
groupwise heteroscedasticity Baum (2001).
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In this way, we control for time effects in order to capture any unexpected variation
or special events that may affect the dependent variable. Finally, αi represents the
unobserved country-specific characteristics and i,t is the idiosyncratic error term.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Basic Model
Table 2 shows the estimation results and particularly the effect of our demographic
variables on total pension expenses (size) and pension spending per retiree (generos-
ity). Other examples of proxy variables for the political clout of the elderly can be
found in Hollanders and Koster (2012). As we can see from Table 2, the effects of the
demographic variables on the size of the pension programme expenditure are positive
and statistically significant for all the demographic variables, but the projected in the
future old dependency ratio is negative and non-significant. The former results can
be attributed to the “size effect”; the higher number of old people means more total
expenditure. However, the effect of the same demographic variables on the pension
disbursement per retiree is negative and significant only for the current and projected
in the future old dependency ratio. These outcomes are in favour of the “fiscal leak-
age” hypothesis. The high current and projected in the future old dependency ratio
make the pay-as-you-go system less profitable for the currently working voters who
push for less generous pensions. It is interesting to notice here that, when we include
part of the working-age voters in our demographic variable (Plus 55), the negative
effect is moderated (column 4). This can be attributed to the fact that the working-
age voters close to retirement age will not claim less generous pensions, even though
the profitability of the system is lower because they are about to retire.
[Insert Table 2]
Furthermore, as we can observe from Table 2, the economic variables have the ex-
pected effects on pension spending, both on total size and per retiree. More specif-
ically, the higher the per capita income in the economy, the higher the per capita
benefits for the retirees. However, when we consider the total size of the pension
programme, we obtain the opposite outcome, which is even statistically significant
(column 3). This means that the higher the average income in the economy, the lower
the political tendency to spend on any major type of social programme. In the case
where GDP is growing faster than the outlays on pensions and the population does
not change dramatically, higher GDP per capita can result in lower expenditure on
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pensions (total size). As shown, the effect of real GDP growth is negative for all the
specifications of the model. The interest rate, as expected, has a negative effect on
the spending level because the higher the interest rate of the long-term bonds, the
more expensive it is for the government to borrow. This will restrict the financial
resources that can be devoted to the pension programme. Trade openness has a neg-
ative impact on pension expenditure, as predicted by the aforementioned “race to
the bottom” hypothesis.18. The effect of unemployment on the generosity of the sys-
tem (benefits per pensioner) is counter-intuitive. The intuitive result would be that
high unemployment binds extra funds that could be used for other social policies like
pensions. Moreover, the high unemployment rate would mean fewer current contri-
butions to the PAYG pension system. Finally, union density has a positive effect, as
expected, because stronger unions can claim higher benefits for their workers when
they retire. However, this effect is only weakly significant (p-value<10%).
The political variables show that the effect of a surplus coalition government (G.T.
3) has a more negative effect than the single majority government on the generosity
of the pension system. We have the same direction effect but with an even bigger
magnitude as we move towards weaker governments, single-party minority and multi-
party minority government (G.T. 4 and G.T. 5, respectively). It seems that the more
multitudinous a government, the easier it is to reduce the level of outlays on pensions,
especially spending per pensioner. An intuitive reasoning is that voters cannot detect
who is responsible, among all the coalition parties, for cuts in retirement expenses.
The voters cannot blame and punish them in the next elections and, therefore, in a
coalition government there is reduced responsibility for each member. The categorical
variable of the government ideology shows that, compared with the government totally
dominated by right-wing parties, a government of balanced power between left and
right is less generous in terms of per-pensioner spending. A government with a mixed
ideology cannot agree on pension reform and just keeps it the same. However, at
the same time, the number of the pensioners is increasing, making the per-pensioner
spending decrease. The same argument as above can be used. One more interesting
result is the fact that a dominance of social-democratic and other left-wing parties in
government has a positive effect on the size of the system compared to the hegemony
of right-wing parties. This result can be explained in the context of the idea that
the social-democratic and left-wing parties are prone to a bigger welfare state and
therefore to a higher level of disbursement for pensions.
Finally, it is obvious that time has a positive effect on both generosity and the
18Although (Castles 2004) does not find any significant evidence in favour of this hypothesis
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size of the system, because the welfare state in most OECD countries was flourishing
and the number of pensioners has increased significantly, increasing the total amount
spent on pensions.
3.3.2 Non-linear regression function
In this section of the paper, we extend the scope of this empirical literature by exam-
ining the presence of non-linear effects in our model. As far as we are concerned, the
only study from the empirical literature on political economy of the social security
that considers the non-linear effect of ageing on social-spending patterns is the one
undertaken by Lindert (1996).
First, in order to check for non-linear effects, we test which specification fits our
data better with the help of simple scatter-plots and regressions.19 We conclude that
the cubic regression model fits the data better than the quadratic or the linear one.
Furthermore, we run some regressions excluding the rest of the independent variables
and we confirm that the cubic specification is better.20 Therefore, as suggested by
the tests, the population regression is polynomial of degree up to 3.
[Insert Table 3]
In addition to the preliminary checks, we run the “full” regressions with the whole
set of independent variables. As is obvious from the Table 3, non-linear effects do not
apply between the demographic variables and the size of the pension system (columns
1 and 3). However, as we can see, the effect of the population ratios (ODR and Plus
55) on retirement spending per retiree is non-linear (columns 2 and 4, respectively).
More specifically, the effect of the ODR on retirement spending per retiree can be
analysed through its cubic regression model. A change in the ODR from 13 to 14 %
has a negative impact (-1.201) on pension expenditure, ceteris paribus.21 The negative
impact of the ODR on generosity of the system can be observed until the level where
the ODR=23 %; however, the magnitude of the effect decreases gradually from 13
to 23. This direction of the effect is clearly in favour the “fiscal leakage” hypothesis;
the generosity of the PAYG pension system decreases with a larger share of elderly
people in society. As we can observe after this point (ODR=23 %), a change in the old
dependency ratio from 23 to 24 has a positive effect on pension and this effect holds
19See Figure 1 and Figure 2 in the Appendix.
20Evidence for non-linear relationship (regressions) between the demographic variables and spending on pensions is
provided by Table 9 in the Appendix.
21The range of the variable old dependency ratio in our data is from 13 to 33% and for Plus 55 is from 26 to 57 %,
respectively.
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until the point where the ODR=28 %. The demographic transition in this range (23
to 28) has a positive effect on pension generosity and that is in favour of the “elderly
power” hypothesis. However, beyond the point where the old dependency ratio is 28,
we again observe the negative impact of a change in the ODR on pension generosity,
and the magnitude of the effect increases as the old dependency ratio increases, even
beyond our data range. The intuition behind these results can be as follows. The
initial increase in the number of retirees puts pressure on the pension system and
therefore has a negative effect on it. However, as the old dependency ratio grows, it
reaches a certain point (ODR=23 %) where the elderly acquire considerable political
power in order to influence the government to favour more generous pensions. It seems
that they manage to cancel out the negative effect on the PAYG pension system from
the increasing number of old people. Nevertheless, after a certain point (ODR=28
%), the number of retirees is too big to be counterbalanced by the political power of
the elderly.
From column 3 of Table 3, we can observe that the ratio of people over 55 years
old to the working-age population (Plus 55) has no non-linear effect on the size of the
system, just as in the case of the old dependency ratio. However, in column 4 we can
see that the population regression is polynomial of degree up to 3. More specifically,
if the ratio Plus 55 increases from 26 to 27 %, then the effect on the generosity of the
system is negative (-1.089), ceteris paribus. The negative effect holds until the ratio
is 39 %. Beyond this point, a percentage change in the ratio has a positive effect on
the generosity, until the ratio is equal to 52 %. This constitutes evidence in favour of
the “elderly power” hypothesis. Thus, the political power of an increasing population
of elderly has a positive effect on pension spending per retiree. However, when we
extrapolate the analysis until the end of the data range (26-57 %), the effect of an
increase in the ratio Plus 55 beyond the point of 52% again has a negative effect on
the generosity of the system, ceteris paribus. This outcome is in favour of the ”fiscal
leakage” hypothesis, because the pension system becomes less sustainable by having
a very high number of old people.
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4 The Effect of Population Ageing on Public Education Spend-
ing
In this section of the paper we investigate the impact of population ageing on educa-
tion expenditure and empirically examine the theoretical link between pensions and
education. In addition, we conduct an analysis by level of education in order to test
whether ageing has a different impact on each level of education (spending).
4.1 Data
We use panel data for 31 OECD22 countries and yearly observations over the period
1996-2012. In Table 4, we summarize the main descriptive statistics of the variables
that we use in our model.23 The first two variables according to Table 4 are used
as dependent variables and represent the total education outlay as a percentage of
GDP (EST) and per-student outlay (ESPS), respectively.24 A closer look at Table
4 and Table 10 shows that, for both total education and per-student spending, the
differences between countries are bigger than the differences within countries (over
years). The next two variables are the total (RST) and per-retiree pension expendi-
ture (RSPR). We incorporate the pension outlays in order to check the potential link
with education expenditure.
[Insert Table 4]
The demographic variables (PRODR, ODR, PopEduc, Fertility) describe the pro-
jected old dependency ratio 17 years in the future (2013-2029), the current old depen-
dency ratio, the population of official age for education and the fertility rate, respec-
tively. First, the projected old dependency ratio is employed to examine the effect
that future ageing has on current education expenditure. The underlying hypothesis
here is that the working-age generation, realizing the forthcoming demographic crisis,
chooses to invest in education in order to preserve its pension benefits in the future.
Therefore, it is expected that the effect of the projected old dependency ratio will
have a positive effect on education spending. Second, the current old dependency ra-
22Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., U.S.A.
23 Definitions and sources of the variables can be found in Table 11 in the Appendix.
24Total general (local, regional and central) government expenditure on education (current, capital, and trans-
fers), expressed as a percentage of GDP. It includes expenditure funded by transfers from international sources to
government.
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tio is used to test the hypothesis that there is a conflict over public resources between
generations because of the increasing political power of the elderly. Third, the young
population of official age for education is used to control for the size effect, namely
that a larger proportion of pupils/students could mean a higher budget allocated to
education. Finally, we have the fertility rate that is used as a proxy for the pro-
portion of parents in the voting population. Parents are expected to push for more
spending on public education as their children benefit directly from a higher quality
of education services.25
The macroeconomic variables GDP per capita (GDPpc) and real GDP growth
(RGDPgr) are used as control variables. The former variable is an indicator of the
level of economic development in a country and the latter is used as a control for the
business cycle. In addition, we include two fiscal variables, tax revenues (TaxRev),
total social expenditure (TotSocExp) and social expenditure not including retirement
spending (SocExp), in order to control for the fact that countries with higher total tax
receipts and a more generous general welfare system might spend more on education.
Tax receipts include taxes on income, profits and capital gains and social security
contributions. Respectively, social expenditure includes survivors and incapacity-
related benefits, health, family, active labour market programmes, unemployment,
housing and other social policy areas.
The variable MYS (Mean Years of Schooling) illustrates the average number of
years of education received by people aged 25 and older. This variable tries to capture
the quality of the educational system as referred to in Molina-Morales et al. (2013).
It is assumed that the more you study the better your educational level. In addition,
we use three institutional variables, globalization index (G.I.), index of voice and
accountability (V.A.I.) and index of economic freedom (E.F.I.).26 The first one shows
how globalised a country is at the political, economic, cultural and social level. The
underlying hypothesis is that the more open the economy is, the more countries are
engaged in the ”race to the bottom”, reducing their spending and taxes in order
to be more competitive vis a vis the rest of the world. The second index captures
perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association,
and a free media; in general, the variable captures the level of democracy in a country.
It is expected that a higher level of democracy will lead to higher education spending.
Finally, the last index includes assessments on commercial policy, government tax
25The fertility rate variable appears only in the per-student model specifications.
26All three indices are taken from Molina-Morales et al. (2013).
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load, government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, foreign investment
and capital flow, foreign activity, financial activity, salary and price control, property
rights, and black market regulation and activity. Here too, it is expected that a higher
degree of economic freedom leads to a larger amount spent on education policy.
Furthermore, we include in our model a dummy variable (Left) that accounts for
the political ideology of the governing party. The dummy variable takes 1 when the
government is either left-wing or social-democratic and 0 otherwise. It is predicted
that left-wing governments are more fervent toward redistribution through social poli-
cies and education in order to favour their electoral base that lies among poorer social
layers [Castles (1989); Busemeyer (2007)]. In addition, as is shown empirically, left-
wing governments favour more generous spending packages on social policies and
therefore on education [Roubini and Sachs (1989); Kontopoulos and Perotti (1997)].
Finally, we show in Table 4 the descriptive statistics of pre-primary (PPES), pri-
mary (PES), secondary (SES) and tertiary (TES) education spending and the popu-
lation of the official age for these levels of education, respectively (ppoap, poap, soap,
toap), that are used in order to investigate the effect of projected ageing per level of
education.27
4.2 Methodology
Our empirical approach complements the existing evidence on the determinants of
public education spending [Castles (1989); Busemeyer (2007); Molina-Morales et al.
(2013)]. Nevertheless, we extend the literature by focusing on the demographic tran-
sition. More specifically, we start by examining the generational conflict hypothesis
in order to compare it with previous empirical studies. We then investigate how the
projected population ageing influences the current investment in public education.
Previous empirical studies identify a set of variables that explains the variation
in public education expenditure. We construct our model using a set of political,
economic and institutional determinants, most of which have been identified by the
previous studies. However, we extend the scope of the previous studies by adding,
into the model, variables that capture the current and future demographic features.
In order to choose our estimation strategy we conduct some diagnostic tests. Pri-
marily, we have to decide between pooled OLS - which takes into account both be-
tween and within variation - and Random Effects (RE) which consider that the dif-
ferences across countries have a significant influence on the dependent variable. In
order to decide, we use the adjusted instead of the simple Breusch and Pagan (1980)
27See Table 8
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Lagrange multiplier (LM) test. It might be the case that, in the presence of first-order
serial correlation, the simple LM test by Breusch-Pagan 1980 too often rejects the
correct null hypothesis of no random effects. Therefore, we have to conduct some
complementary tests: the Baltagi and Li (1995) test for first-order serial correlation
and the Baltagi and Li (1991) joint test for serial correlation and random effects.28
According to the outcome of these tests, the Ho hypothesis that the variance of the
random effect is zero or that there are no individual effects in the model is rejected.
Therefore, in the presence of country-specific characteristics (individual) heterogene-
ity, we have to decide between using random or fixed effects. Thus, we apply the
test introduced by Hausman (1978), which leads us to a strong rejection of the null
hypothesis that random effects provide consistent estimates or that there is no cor-
relation between the error term and the independent variables. Therefore, the test
indicates use of the fixed effects method that produces a consistent estimator. This
method takes into account the within variation (over time)29 and controls for the
unobserved characteristics that remain constant over the years and that might affect
public expenditure on education, like culture heritage or religion, etc.30
Additionally, we conduct a series of other diagnostic tests: the modified Wald
test for heteroscedasticity by Baum (2001); Frees (1995) and Pesaran (2004); cross-
sectional dependence tests; and serial correlation test or the test for autocorrelation
by Wooldridge (2002). 31 These tests first show that the idiosyncratic errors are het-
eroscedastic, meaning that the variation of the errors across countries is not constant.
Second, there is contemporaneous correlation, namely the errors between countries are
correlated, and third there is a first-order autocorrelation in errors within countries.
As mentioned in Cameron and Trivedi (2010), ignoring cross-sectional dependence
and correlation of errors over time can lead to systematic bias and thus to erroneous
results.
Therefore, we have to use estimation methods that allow us to conduct consistent
estimations in the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional
correlation and heteroscedasticity across panels. For that purpose, we use an estima-
tor (SCC) introduced by Hoechle (2007), that produces Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
standard errors for the estimated coefficients using fixed effects. In our specification
of this estimator, the error structure is assumed to be heteroscedastic, autocorrelated
28These tests show that both serial correlation and random effects are present.
29The test for time fixed effects reveals that no time fixed effects are needed in our specification of the model.
30As referred to in Castles (1994), cultural heritage and the tradition of Catholicism can play an important role in
public expenditure on education. The countries that have Catholicism as their predominant religion might have to
spend less on education of children as the Catholic Church undertakes a large part of the childrens education.
31The latter is in addition to the previous Baltagi-Li test, as we saw above.
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up to one lag and correlated between the countries. As mentioned in Hoechle (2007),
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to very general forms of cross-sectional and
temporal dependence when the time dimension is large enough. Additionally, their
particular technique to estimate standard errors does not impose any restrictions
on the number of countries, which can be even bigger than the number of periods.
Finally, the implementation of Driscoll and Kraay’s covariance estimator works for
both balanced and unbalanced panels Cameron and Trivedi, (2010). All the above
properties make this estimator suitable for our panel data.
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Where (Y) is the dependent variable, education expenditure as a % of GDP or
expenditure per student. Three demographic variables Di,t: old dependency ratio
(ODR) or future old dependency ratio (PR.ODR), the young population of official
age for education (sPopEduc) and fertility rate. Macroeconomic control variables
Mi,t: GDP per capita (GDPpc) and real GDP growth rate (RGDPgr). Fiscal control
variables Fi,t: tax revenues (TaxRev) and total social expenditure (TotSocExp).
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Control for the quality of education Si,t: mean years of schooling (M.Y.S.). Institu-
tional variables/indices Ii,t: globalization (G.I.), voice and accountability (V.A.I.) and
economic freedom (E.F.I). Dummy variable for the political ideology of the govern-
ment: Left Li,t. Finally, αi represents the unobserved country-specific characteristics
and i,t is the idiosyncratic error term.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 The effect of the current old dependency ratio on education spending
We begin the presentation of our results with Table 5, where we test the generational
conflict hypothesis using as the dependent variable education spending in total (EST)
as a percentage of GDP and education spending per student (ESPS).
According to the ”generational conflict” hypothesis, the increasing percentage of
old people in the population has a negative effect on educational spending. In order
to test whether there is conflict in relation to fiscal resources between the generation
of people over 65 years old and the generation of young people, we employ the old
32Later, in the regressions, we ”break” the total social expenditure into two variables, total retirement spending
(RST) and the rest of social expenditure (SocExp).
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dependency ratio (ODR). As we can see from Table 5, the effect of the ODR on
total education spending without controlling for total social expenditure and for the
institutional indices is positive and statistically non-significant (column 1). However,
when we take into account total social expenditure, the effect of the ODR on education
spending becomes negative, as expected by the ”generational conflict” hypothesis
(columns 2 and 3). The reason for running the model sequentially and starting
without including total social expenditure is the plausible strong relationship between
education spending and total social expenditure. It is reasonable to expect people to
vote for social packages as a whole (pensions and education). For instance, if voters
are willing to support an extended welfare state, then they might also be willing to
support higher education spending. However, if we do not take into account social
expenditure then, as our results show, the ODR can absorb these effects.
A closer look shows that an increase of 1% in the ODR generates a reduction of
0.037% in total education expenditure (column 3). However, the old dependency ratio
has a negative but not significant effect on education spending per student (column
5 and 6). Furthermore, as we can see in Table 5, the sign of the young population
eligible for education in education spending is positive and becomes insignificant in
consideration of the level of the welfare system and certain institutional factors.
[Insert Table 5]
Regarding the performance of the control variables, it seems that the level of
economic development (GDPpc) has a positive and significant impact only on per-
student spending (columns 4, 5 and 6). Moreover, as is obvious, education spending
is not affected significantly by the business cycle (real GDP growth). In addition,
the level of fiscal resources (tax revenue) has the expected positive sign for total
spending on education but they only weakly affect the level of education spending per
student. Next, the size of the welfare state represented by total social expenditure
has an important positive impact on both measures of education spending.33 The
variable used as an approximation of education quality, the mean years of schooling
(M.Y.S.), has no significant influence on education. Left-wing governments have a
non-important influence on education spending. Finally, the fertility rate, which
reflects the interest of young parents in education spending, has a very strong and
positive influence on per-student spending. A higher fertility rate means more children
per couple and that makes young parents more willing to ”push” for a higher level
33The social expenditure used for these regressions also includes retirement spending.
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of educational expenditure. We could call/label that the ”political power of parents”
hypothesis.
In regard to the institutional variables in Table 5, globalization index (GI), Voice
and Accountability Index (VAI) and Economic Freedom Index (EFI) have the ex-
pected effects. The first one has a negative sign, reflecting the ”race to the bottom”
hypothesis that claims that more globalised countries engage more actively in com-
petition with other countries and, hence, aim to lower the level of public spending in
order to be able to lower taxes and become more competitive. The second index has
a positive effect on both measures of education spending, showing that a higher level
of democracy promotes the expansion of the public education system. The Index of
Economic Freedom shows that the process of economic liberalization has encouraged
higher spending on public education.
Therefore, we find only partial support for the generational conflict hypothesis, as
the old dependency ratio has a significant and negative effect only on education spend-
ing as a percentage of GDP but not on education spending per student. This result
gives us a hint that there might be something more complicated in the relationship
between population ageing and education spending, that we need to examine.
4.3.2 Generational conflict and the link between pensions and education
One way to investigate further the relationship between current population ageing
and education spending is to check for possible non-linear effects. One can claim
that it is plausible to assume that the impact of population ageing on education
expenditure depends on the scarcity of fiscal resources. For instance, the effect of
the old dependency ratio on education spending might depend on the level of total
retirement expenditure. Thus, we need to disentangle the effect of retirement spending
from the effect of total social expenditure on educational outlays. In order to do
so, we ”break” total social expenditure into two parts, social expenditure (survivors
and incapacity-related benefits, health, family, active labour market programmes,
unemployment, housing and other social policy areas) and retirement spending (public
pensions). In this way, we are able to interact retirement spending with the old
dependency ratio in order to capture potential non-linearities in the relationship of
population ageing and education expenditure. In addition, we obtain the direct effect
of retirement spending on education expenditure in order to test whether there is a
direct link between these two public policies.34
34As suggested by Kemnitz (2000), in contrast with the negative predictions for the social security system due to
higher life expectancy and lower fertility, the demographic transition has beneficial effects on both education and
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[Insert Table 6]
As we can see from column 1 of Table 6, total retirement spending has a positive
but non-significant effect on total education spending, and the new variable for so-
cial expenditure is strongly significant and positive. In addition, we do not observe
any significant evidence in favour of the generational conflict. However, in column 2,
where the interaction term between the old dependency ratio and retirement spend-
ing is taken into account, we can observe that the individual effect of both variables
becomes significant and, additionally, the interaction term is significantly negative.
In technical terms, this means that the effect of the old dependency ratio on total
education outlays is non-linear and depends on the level of total retirement expen-
diture.35 More specifically, the effect of the old dependency ratio on education is
positive until a certain level of total retirement spending (RST=8%). When the level
of retirement expenditure exceeds 8% of GDP, then the effect of the old dependency
ratio on total education outlays becomes negative. In general, an increase in the old
dependency ratio has two opposite effects on education spending. On the one hand,
there is a negative effect on education spending due to the increased number of old
people that put greater pressure on fiscal resources (generational conflict). On the
other hand, there is a positive effect that results from the fact that the working-
age generation, realizing that the increasing number of old people makes the PAYG
system less profitable and unsustainable, decides to invest in the education of young
people in order to boost their productivity and consequently the revenues from taxing
their income in the future. Therefore, when retirement spending is low, the former
effect is dominated by the latter and hence the net effect on education expenditure is
positive. This effect is a result of the choice by the working-age generation to invest
public resources in education in order to ensure their future pensions. However, when
the total expenditure on retirement is quite high, the former effect dominates the
latter, and hence the net effect on education is negative. This outcome reflects the
fact that, when there are limited fiscal resources, an increase in the political power
pensions. According to his theoretical model, in a steady state equilibrium there is higher investment in per capita
human capital and a higher contribution rate to the social security
35Isolating the effect of the ODR and RST on total education spending, we obtain the expression below:
EST = 0.1141 ∗ODR + 0.3760 ∗RST − 0.0144 ∗ODR ∗RST
In order to obtain the effect of the old dependency ratio on total education spending, we take the derivative of EST
with respect to the ODR:
∂EST/∂ODR = 0.1141− 0.0144 ∗RST
In the same way, we can obtain the derivatives with respect to RST.
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of the elderly is translated into a decrease in education expenditure, because the old
generation tries to appropriate more public resources in their own favour.
Similarly, after a certain point (ODR=26%), the effect of increasing spending on
retirement has a negative effect on total education spending. For example, when
the ODR is equal to its mean value (21%), in our sample the effect of an additional
percentage point of total retirement spending on total education spending is 0.07%.
However, when the ODR is higher, for instance 30%, then the effect on education
is -0.06%. The theoretical intuition behind this result can be derived from the gen-
erational conflict hypothesis. Thus, when the old generation is politically stronger
(higher ODR), an increase in total retirement spending is financed out of the same
public resources that are used for education expenditure.
Furthermore, as we can see from Table 6 (column 4), the same interaction effect is
present in the case of education spending per student. The effect of total retirement
spending depends on the level of the old dependency ratio. However, in this case the
effect of total retirement spending on education becomes negative at the point where
the level of the ODR is 37%, which is the maximum value that the ODR takes in
our sample. Likewise, the effect of the old dependency ratio becomes negative only
after the level of total retirement spending is above 11 % of GDP. Therefore, the
negative impact of the interaction terms takes place only at a very high level of the
old dependency ratio and retirement spending, respectively. This evidence is in favour
of the generational conflict hypothesis that claims that there is competition for fiscal
resources between young and old generations. In other words, the increasing share
of old people (retirees) has a negative impact on education expenditure per student.
However, we show that the effect of generational conflict is non-linear rather than
linear, as is highlighted in the past literature.
Last but not least, in columns 5 and 6 we present the effect of retirement spending
per retiree on education and the interaction of retirement spending with the old de-
pendency ratio, respectively. It is obvious that there is no interaction between the old
dependency ratio and average spending per retiree. Hence, the impact of retirement
spending per retiree and the impact of the old dependency ratio on education do not
depend on each other. As we can see from Table 6, it seems that the higher the
average spending on retirees, the higher the education expenditure per student. The
intuition behind this result is that an increase in education spending per student as
a result of an increase in average pensions is financially backed by the working-age
generation because, for them, this is a way to secure their future pensions. More
specifically, an increase of $ 100 in average pensions results in an increase of $ 6.5 in
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education spending per student. For the same reason a one percentage point increase
in the old dependency ratio enhances education spending with $37.5 per student.
After focusing on the current old dependency ratio, we find that there is com-
petition for resources, at least from a certain point of total retirement spending.
Therefore, it is plausible to claim that the current population ageing, in fact, is more
related to competition for resources than to demographic expectations. In the next
section, instead of the current we use the projected old dependency ratio. We thus try
to separate the demographic effect on education from the competition for resources
of current generations.
4.3.3 The impact of the projected population ageing on education spending.
As already mentioned in the literature review, many scholars have stressed the im-
portance of the link between the PAYG pensions system and public education, more
specifically how the particular structure of the PAYG system provides incentives to
invest in education. However, it would be even more interesting to investigate the link
between pensions and education by paying special attention to future demographic
expectations. Thus, in this section, we test the aforementioned theoretical prediction
of Gradstein and Kaganovich (2004) that the process of future population ageing has
a positive effect on education spending. We capture the particular demographic trend
using the estimated projections of the old dependency ratio. In addition, we use the
young people of official age to attend any education level as a proxy for the number
of pupils/students in the total population. The proportion of students in the total
population has declined slightly since the beginning of our sample and is predicted to
decline even more in the near future, due to the ageing process that has just started
in most of the developed countries that we analyze in this paper.
[Insert Table 7]
As we can see from Table 7, the projected old dependency ratio brings about a pos-
itive impact on both total level of education spending and spending per student. A
closer look reveals that a one percentage point rise in the proportion of old people
in the future ceteris paribus generates a 0.021 % increase (column 1) in total educa-
tion spending and a $52 rise in per-student expenditure (column 2). In addition, as
expected, a higher number of students increases the public spending in education as
a percentage of GDP. Furthermore, a one percentage point increase in the fertility
rate that captures parental willingness to support education brings about roughly a
$1300 increase in education expenditure per student (column 2). In general, most of
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the control variables in these specifications of the model behave as expected by the
literature. The political ideology seems to have only a weak role in the determination
of education expenses. More specifically, left-wing and social-democratic governments
tend to spend more per student than their ideological opponents. As in the previous
section, the level of the welfare state (excluding pensions) and economic development
have a positive and very significant impact on per-student spending. Finally, institu-
tional indices have significant effects in the expected direction. Furthermore, the main
results do not change when, instead of using total social expenditure, we introduce
the level of total retirement spending separately from the rest of the social outlays
(columns 2 and 3). Also, the effect of the projected old dependency ratio remains the
same when we use retirement spending per retiree, which also has a positive impact
on education spending per student, providing further evidence in favour of the link
between education and pensions (column 4).
The above findings are consistent with the main theoretical outcomes of Gradstein
and Kaganovich (2004). More specifically, in order to interpret the results, one can
argue that the working-age generations, realizing the severe consequences of the ageing
process upon their retirement benefits, decide to exploit the current set-up of the
PAYG pension system. Thus, they react to an increasing projected old dependency
ratio by investing in education of young people “today” in order to boost the labour
productivity and consequently the revenues from income tax “tomorrow”. Hence,
in this way the fiscal resources generated from the investment of the working-age
generation in education will be used to pay for their pensions.
Last but not least, we conduct a further investigation of the effect of population
ageing on public education. More specifically, we disaggregate total education spend-
ing into expenditure per level of public education (pre-primary, primary, secondary
and tertiary). This allows us to examine whether the projected ageing represented
by the old dependency ratio affects each education level to a different extent.36 In
order to estimate the effect of population ageing, we employ the same model as in
Table 7 (column 1). In this specification of the model, among other variables we
control for total level of social expenditure (pensions plus other welfare expenditure)
and the proportion of pupils/students per level of education. Dependent variables are
spending by education level measured as a percentage of GDP.
The empirical outcomes of this analysis show that spending on non-mandatory,
pre-primary and tertiary education is positively affected by the increasing percentage
of the elderly. In contrast, the impact on the mandatory, primary and secondary ed-
36See Table 8, Appendix.
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ucational level is significantly negative and insignificantly positive, respectively. One
can argue that an increase in the projected old dependency ratio raises the future wel-
fare state fiscal requirements (pensions and other social expenditure) as the number
of beneficiaries increases. Hence, enhancing the productivity of the current and future
generations as an attempt to obtain additional resources (tax revenues) can be con-
sidered as the main policy intervention to handle the forthcoming fiscal sustainability
issues of the welfare state. Thus, in order to boost current and future productiv-
ity, voters decide to support investments in the non-mandatory levels of education
and those more related to productivity, pre-primary and tertiary education. In our
opinion, the investment in non-mandatory education takes place only because there
is a space for policy intervention. In other words, increasing the quality of the non-
mandatory educational levels may have a larger positive effect on the participation
rate of these educational levels than on participation in mandatory education.
More specifically, investment in pre-primary public education can positively affect
the productivity of young parents (especially young mothers) by supporting them
with such a time-consuming process as child-raising. Therefore, improving the qual-
ity of pre-primary education could eventually lead to an increase in productivity.
However, in the case of primary and secondary education, the mandatory character
of participation prevents such an investment from being beneficial for the produc-
tivity of current workers. Regarding the productivity of future workers, there is a
positive impact from the projected population ageing on higher education spending.
Consequently, one can expect that this could bring about an increase in participa-
tion in tertiary education and eventually lead to a future working generation with
enhanced skills and productivity. In other words, as mentioned above, working-age
voters considering their future public benefits choose to support investments in higher
education in order to boost the productivity of the young generation and ”reap” the
benefits from increased income tax in the future.
The outcomes of the latter analysis by level of education should be seen only as
suggestive, since further theoretical and empirical research is needed to test the ro-
bustness and consistence of the theoretical hypotheses used in our investigation. In
addition, the very nature of our data, unbalanced data, different number of observa-
tions per level of education, etc., might bring about spurious results. Considering all
these facts, we are led to a recommendation that the results should only be seen as
suggestive rather than conclusive.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the impact of population ageing, which is a result of ex-
tended life expectancy and the reduced fertility rate, on public pension and education
spending and on the relationship between them.
Regarding pension spending from the political economy point of view, the de-
mographic transition enhances the political clout of older voters in favour of more
generous pensions, the so-called ”elderly power” hypothesis. However, at the same
time, the number of people eligible for pensions increases, making the PAYG system
less sustainable, and leading to spending cuts, the ”fiscal leakage” hypothesis. Our
empirical findings provide an indication that population ageing has a non-linear ef-
fect on pension expenditure per retiree and therefore both effects are present. Thus,
the outcome and the strength of both effects depend on the proportion of old people.
Hence, when the old dependency ratio is high, the ”elderly power” effect is dominated
by the ”fiscal leakage” effect.
Concerning the impact of demographic transition on education spending, we find
partial support for the ”generational conflict” hypothesis. More specifically, it is
shown that generational conflict is present but the effect of the old dependency ratio
on education spending depends on the level of total retirement spending. Thus, when
the level of total retirement spending is low and there are more public resources avail-
able, an increase in the old dependency ratio will have a positive effect on education
spending. However, when the total retirement spending is quite high, an increase in
the old dependency ratio has a negative impact on education spending, reflecting the
struggle between generations for limited public resources. Therefore, it seems that the
increased political power of the older generation that supports pro-pension policies
has a negative impact on both total and per-student education spending.
Furthermore, we scrutinize how the political and economic system reacts to future
demographic changes, and we find that the increase in the projected (future) old de-
pendency ratio has a positive impact on education expenditure. The intuition behind
this result is that the working-age generation, realizing the higher life expectancy and
the increasing number of retirees, invests more in public education “today” in order
to derive some benefits in the form of higher contributions (income tax) for pensions
“tomorrow”. This finding suggests the existence of a link between public education
and pension expenditure. This could indicate that, even in the absence of altruism,
middle-aged voters would be in favour of a public education programme as a way to
improve their future prospective pensions thanks to an increase in the productivity
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of future contemporaneous workers. This could have some policy implications in the
face of the imminent demographic crisis of PAYG-financed pension systems. Educa-
tional expenditure can be seen as a complement or an alternative to the long-discussed
transition to a capitalization system.
Finally, by disaggregating education expenditure by level of education, we try to
examine whether there is a different impact of future population ageing on each edu-
cational level. The results show that there is a positive effect only on non-mandatory
education spending. Our interpretation of this outcome is that investment in non-
mandatory education only occurs because there is space for policy intervention in
order to increase the participation and consequently the productivity of the current
and future working-age generation. Although the outcomes that we have from this
analysis are statistically significant, they should be seen as suggestive rather than
conclusive.
In general, further research is needed on both the empirical and the theoretical side.
On the empirical side, it will first be necessary to investigate how the results change
once the recently started population ageing process progresses. Except for the data
on the projected old dependency ratio, the rest of the data set employed finishes in
2012, when the “baby boom” cohorts start retiring in most OECD countries. Second,
the current analysis could be extended – provided that the data are available - to
the whole set of intergenerational public transfers, and also by taking into account
education spending by level of education. In general, further research is needed in
order to investigate the reasons for private transfers and how they interact with
the public transfers introduced by welfare state programmes. The recent literature
on endogenous preferences calls for a thorough consideration of altruism formation.
Along these lines, the strong positive effect of fertility on education spending per
student that we find could be indicative of the political power of parents driven by
altruism or other motivations.
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TABLES
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
A. Dependent Variables-Retirement Spending
N mean sd min max
RST: Retirement Spending (% of GDP) 161 6.54 2.34 2.50 12.42
RSPR: Retirement Spending per Retiree 160 10.39 5.65 1.51 31.47
B. Population Variables
N mean sd min max
Plus 55 161 36.90 5.30 26.28 56.97
ODR: Old Dependency Ratio 161 21.25 3.67 13.42 33.43
PRODR: Projected Old Dependency Ratio 161 33.44 8.76 16.71 63.64
C. Macroeconomic Variables
N mean sd min max
GDPpc: GDP per capita 161 22.93 11.97 5.524 81.401
RGDPgr: Real GDP Growth 161 2.40 1.63 -2.00 10.31
Intrate: Interest Rate 152 8.24 4.35 1.29 25.83
Openec: Trade Openness 161 73.47 44.89 16.86 307.06
Unemp: Unemployment 161 6.72 3.73 0.19 20.96
UnDen: Union Density 161 41.10 21.35 7.62 94.07
C. Political Variables
N mean sd min max
GT: Government Type 161 2.43 1.14 1.00 5.00
GP: Government Party 161 2.42 1.35 1.00 5.00
Note: RSPR and GDPpc are measured in $ 1000.
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Table 2: Baseline Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RST RSPR RST RSPR RST RSPR
ODR 0.209*** -0.168*
(0.031) (0.076)
Plus55 0.122** -0.0983
(0.033) (0.057)
PRODR -0.0365 -0.201**
(0.048) (0.060)
GDPpc -0.0667 0.166** -0.0898* 0.185** -0.129*** 0.184***
(0.0365) (0.0540) (0.0369) (0.0494) (0.0255) (0.0351)
RGDPgr -0.179** -0.201** -0.187** -0.194** -0.236*** -0.191**
(0.049) (0.058) (0.057) (0.061) (0.058) (0.059)
Intrate -0.157** -0.152* -0.178** -0.136 -0.186** -0.130
(0.052) (0.073) (0.052) (0.076) (0.056) (0.075)
Openc -0.0190* -0.0474** -0.0156* -0.0501** -0.0195* -0.0432**
(0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.015)
Unemp 0.0716 0.179* 0.0711 † 0.180* 0.0833 † 0.156*
(0.042) (0.067) (0.038) (0.071) (0.040) (0.058)
Un.Den. 0.0372 0.0640 † 0.0413 † 0.0606 0.0451 † 0.0644 †
(0.022) (0.037) (0.022) (0.038) (0.024) (0.037)
G.T.2 -0.258 -0.790 -0.307 -0.749 -0.409 -0.661
(0.258) (0.691) (0.286) (0.675) (0.284) (0.700)
G.T.3 -0.549 -1.665* -0.519 -1.690* -0.442 -1.783*
(0.310) (0.698) (0.350) (0.666) (0.465) (0.670)
G.T.4 -0.647* -1.914* -0.654 -1.908* -0.715* -1.815
(0.307) (0.884) (0.339) (0.855) (0.296) (0.898)
G.T.5 -1.256 -2.886* -1.303 -2.847* -1.542* -2.533*
(0.643) (1.098) (0.718) (1.047) (0.716) (0.981)
G.P.2 -0.150 -0.432 -0.134 -0.445 -0.232 -0.327
(0.199) (0.386) (0.202) (0.383) (0.217) (0.370)
G.P.3 -0.185 -0.758* -0.169 -0.770* -0.256 -0.627
(0.194) (0.316) (0.199) (0.305) (0.202) (0.331)
G.P.4 0.380* -0.326 0.487* -0.412 0.396 -0.463
(0.173) (0.442) (0.224) (0.419) (0.226) (0.447)
G.P.5 0.0979 -0.919 0.129 -0.943 0.0462 -0.786
(0.286) (0.581) (0.292) (0.595) (0.247) (0.607)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 152 152 152 152 152 152
Adj. R2-within 0.692 0.920 0.665 0.919 0.615 0.924
Note: Fixed effects regressions with robust standard errors reported in parentheses,
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10. RSPR and GDPpc are measured in $ 1000. Con-
stant is included but not reported.
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Table 3: Non-linear specification of the demographic variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RTS RSPR RTS RSPR
ODR -1.422 -5.743**
(0.914) (1.980)
(ODR)2 0.0691 0.229*
(0.042) (0.088)
(ODR)3 -0.000935 -0.00300*
(0.001) (0.001)
Plus 55 -0.432 -6.764*
(1.162) (2.477)
(Plus 55)2 0.00892 0.156*
(0.029) (0.061)
(Plus 55)3 -0.0000326 -0.00118*
(0.000) (0.000)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 152 152 152 152
Adj. R2-within 0.697 0.928 0.677 0.933
Note. Fixed effects regressions with robust standard errors reported
in parentheses, ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10. RSPR and
GDPpc are measured in $ 1000. Constant is included but not reported.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
A. Education Spending-Dependent Variables
N mean sd min max
EST: Education Spending (% of GDP) 525 5.356853 1.1779 2.9887 8.8069
ESPS: Education Spending per Student 524 5.9218 2.9181 .6691 15.7356
PPES: Pre Primary Education Spending (% of GDP) 369 .4330 .1946 .0291 1.3437
PES: Primary Education Spending (% of GDP) 366 1.4211 .4493 .5381 2.6816
SES: Secondary Education Spending (% of GDP) 373 2.0894 .4368 .9617 2.9748
TES: Tertiary Education Spending (% of GDP) 405 1.2395 .4439 .3059 2.6367
B. Retirement Spending Variables
N mean sd min max
RST: Retirement Spending (% GDP) 520 6.8351 2.8282 .5 13.6
RSPR: Retirement Spending per Retiree 520 12.9240 5.5763 .8376 30.8240
C. Population Variables
N mean sd min max
PRODR: Projected Old Dependency Ratio 527 30.3513 7.0838 10.0491 53.5608
ODR: Old Dependency Ratio 527 21.7864 4.9578 7.6861 39.0432
PopEduc: Population of the Official Age for Education 526 9,865,746 1.68e+07 93,278 8.97e+07
Fertility rate 527 1.6618 .3943 1.08 3.05
ppoap: Population of the official age for Pre-Primary Ed-
ucation
543 1,173,418 2,220,364 12,448 1.23e+07
poap: Population of the official age for Primary Education 543 2,625,343 4,776,337 29,786 2.50e+07
soap: Population of the official age for Secondary Educa-
tion
543 3,037,286 4,952,522 29,481 2.60e+07
toap: Population of the official age for Tertiary Education 542 2,429,867 4,010,869 20,857 2.23e+07
D. Macroeconomic and Fiscal Variables
N mean sd min max
GDPpc: GDP per capita 527 28.5727 10.3194 6.917 66.358
RGDPgr: Real GDP per capita 527 2.5666 3.0219 -14.7 11.8
TaxRev: Tax Revenues 527 34.3577 6.9848 14.84 49.508
TotSocExp: Total Social Expenditures 520 20.3296 5.7230 3.4 31.7
SocExp: Social Expenditures 520 13.4944 3.7477 2.4 21.9
E. Institutional and Political Variables
N mean sd min max
MYS: Mean Years of Schooling 527 10.8601 1.4866 6.4723 13.086
GI: Globalization Index 527 79.8827 8.8547 54.3113 92.3716
VAI: Voice and Accountability Index 527 1.2181 .3581 -.0791 1.8263
EFI: Economic Freedom Index 527 69.8649 6.8704 50.4 83.1
Left 527 .4060 .4915 0 1
Note: RSPR, ESPS and GDPpc are measured in $ 1000.
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Table 5: Current ODR and Education Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EST EST EST ESPS ESPS ESPS
ODR 0.0170 -0.0418** -0.0373* 0.0584* -0.0224 -0.0066
(0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.024) (0.020) (0.018)
PopEduc 0.0246* 0.0089 0.0123
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
GDPpc 0.0044 0.0037 0.0016 0.2308*** 0.2271*** 0.2274***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006)
RGDPgr -0.0346*** 0.0054 0.0048 -0.0457*** 0.0145 0.0163
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
TaxRev 0.0593† 0.0346† 0.0352† 0.0345 0.0054 0.0034
(0.034) (0.020) (0.018) (0.040) (0.022) (0.019)
TotSocExp 0.1534*** 0.1607*** 0.2196*** 0.2228***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.023) (0.023)
M.Y.S. 0.0704 0.0400 0.0069 0.0368 0.0053 -0.0344
(0.071) (0.047) (0.050) (0.125) (0.088) (0.082)
Left 0.0668 0.0479 0.0387 0.1166 0.0830 0.0860
(0.079) (0.068) (0.065) (0.085) (0.060) (0.068)
Fertility 1.0492** 1.3420*** 1.2889***
(0.298) (0.240) (0.231)
G.I. -0.0079* -0.0281***
(0.003) (0.006)
V.A.I. 0.8295*** 0.3359***
(0.076) (0.079)
E.F.I. 0.0218** 0.0278**
(0.006) (0.009)
Obs. 524 517 517 524 517 517
R2-within 0.1112 0.2894 0.3229 0.8933 0.9192 0.9223
Note: Fixed effects regressions with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors reported in parentheses,
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10. ESPS and GDPpc are measured in $ 1000 and
PopEduc is measured in millions of people. Constant is included but not reported.
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Table 6: Generational Conflict and the Link Between Pensions and Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EST EST ESPS ESPS ESPS ESPS
ODR -0.0144 0.1141*** 0.0197 0.0844† 0.0375* -0.0087
(0.016) (0.026) (0.020) (0.043) (0.016) (0.034)
RST 0.0297 0.3760*** 0.0841*** 0.2679**
(0.036) (0.077) (0.018) (0.078)
RST*ODR -0.0144*** -0.0074*
(0.003) (0.003)
RSPR 0.0649*** -0.0058
(0.010) (0.032)
RSPR*ODR 0.0028†
(0.002)
GDPpc -0.0002 -0.0029 0.2268*** 0.2234*** 0.2020*** 0.2079***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
RGDPgr 0.0049 0.0019 0.0157 0.0151 0.0168 0.0168
(0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
TaxRev 0.0272* 0.0263* -0.0063 -0.0042 -0.0011 -0.0037
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
M.Y.S. -0.0064 0.0163 -0.0564 -0.0348 -0.0739 -0.1093
(0.052) (0.056) (0.081) (0.079) (0.082) (0.090)
Left 0.0636 0.0773 0.1108† 0.1181† 0.0980 0.0843
(0.055) (0.060) (0.059) (0.061) (0.060) (0.059)
PopEduc 0.0077 0.0002
(0.014) (0.021)
Fertility 1.1298*** 1.3376** 1.0222*** 0.8426**
(0.229) (0.338) (0.232) (0.263)
SocExp 0.2126*** 0.1994*** 0.2762*** 0.2686*** 0.2782*** 0.2874***
(0.016) (0.011) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
Institutional Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 517 517 517 517 517 517
R2-within 0.3530 0.3831 0.9247 0.9252 0.9262 0.9265
Note: Fixed effects regressions with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors reported in parentheses, ***p<0.001,
**p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10. ESPS, RSPR and GDPpc are measured in $ 1000 and PopEduc is measured
in millions of people. Institutional variables: Globalization index (GI), Voice and Accountability Index
(VAI) and Economic Freedom Index (EFI). Constant is included but not reported.
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Table 7: Projected Old Dependency Ratio and Education Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EST ESPS ESPS ESPS
PRODR 0.0214* 0.0520*** 0.0507*** 0.0641***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011)
GDPpc -0.0060 0.2107*** 0.2104*** 0.1782***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
RGDPgr 0.0023 0.0141 0.0149 0.0168+
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
TaxRev 0.0359+ 0.0084 0.0014 0.0109
(0.020) (0.022) (0.016) (0.017)
M.Y.S. -0.0653 -0.1062 -0.0916 -0.1010
(0.052) (0.071) (0.069) (0.072)
Left 0.0450 0.0969 0.1172+ 0.1019+
(0.067) (0.067) (0.058) (0.058)
PopEduc 0.0286***
(0.007)
TotSocExp 0.1428*** 0.2025***
(0.007) (0.019)
SocExp 0.2588*** 0.2574***
(0.030) (0.027)
RST 0.0834***
(0.009)
Fertility 1.3076*** 1.1870*** 1.1036***
(0.254) (0.263) (0.264)
RSPR 0.0730***
(0.008)
Institutional variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 517 517 517 517
R2-within 0.3199 0.9238 0.9260 0.9279
Note: Fixed effects regressions with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors reported
in parentheses, ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10. ESPS, RSPR and
GDPpc are measured in $ 1000 and PopEduc is measured in millions of
people. Institutional variables: Globalization index (GI), Voice and Ac-
countability Index (VAI) and Economic Freedom Index (EFI). Constant is
included but not reported.
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Table 8: The effect of PRODR on education spending by level of education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PPES PES SES TES
PRODR 0.0205*** -0.0136*** 0.0039 0.0227***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.015) (0.004)
GDPpc -0.0086* 0.0011 -0.0112* -0.0051†
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
RGDPgr -0.0036 0.0006 0.0005 0.0008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
TaxRev -0.0018 -0.0116† 0.0070 0.0009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
M.Y.S. -0.0007 -0.0533*** 0.0155 0.0020
(0.022) (0.006) (0.026) (0.019)
Left 0.0325* -0.0564** -0.0341 -0.0023
(0.012) (0.018) (0.033) (0.011)
TotSocExp 0.0083* 0.0554*** 0.0484*** 0.0218***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004)
ppoap -0.0000
(0.000)
poap 0.0000
(0.000)
soap 0.0000***
(0.000)
toap -0.0000
(0.000)
Institutional Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 365 362 369 400
R2-within 0.2491 0.3639 0.2597 0.3471
Note: Fixed effects regressions with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors reported
in parentheses, ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10. Institutional vari-
ables: Globalization index (GI), Voice and Accountability Index (VAI) and
Economic Freedom Index (EFI). Constant is included but not reported.
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Table 9: ODR and Plus 55 in a non-linear specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RSPR RSPR RSPR RSPR RSPR RSPR
ODR 1.1369*** 2.2932* -12.3138**
(0.258) (0.840) (3.902)
(ODR)2 -0.0354* 0.6450**
(0.016) (0.176)
(ODR)3 -0.0099***
(0.003)
Plus55 0.8672*** 1.9623** -13.6602***
(0.222) (0.621) (3.3808)
(Plus55)2 -0.0137* 0.3834***
(0.0062) (0.084)
(Plus55)3 -0.0032***
(0.0006)
Obs. 160 160 160 160 160 160
Adj.R2 0.3168 0.3176 0.3523 0.3802 0.3903 0.4318
Note: Fixed effects regressions with robust standard errors reported in parentheses,
***p<0.001, **p<0.01,*p<0.05, †p<0.10. RSPR is measured in $ 1000. Constant is
included but not reported.
Table 10: Panel Data Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
EST overall 5.3568 1.1779 2.9887 8.80697 N = 525
between 1.1015 3.3789 8.3052 n = 31
within .45465 2.8273 6.7835 T = 16.9355
ESPS overall 5.9218 2.9181 .66912 15.7356 N = 524
between 2.4411 1.4164 11.3286 n = 31
within 1.6536 1.3138 10.3288 T = 16.9032
RST overall 6.8351 2.8282 .5 13.6 N = 520
between 2.7592 .9411 11.9235 n = 31
within .7299 4.2976 9.7998 T-bar = 16.7742
RSPR overall 12.9240 5.5763 .8376 30.82401 N = 520
between 4.8028 2.1447 22.9954 n = 31
within 2.9598 4.0366 23.4140 T-bar = 16.7742
Note: ESPS and RSPR are measured in $ 1000
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Figure 1: Scatter plot of RSPR and ODR
Figure 2: Scatter plot of RSPR and Plus 55
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Table 11: Data Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition and Source
EST Public Education Spending as % of GDP. Source: UNESCO (2015),
http://data.uis.unesco.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EDULIT DS
ESPS Public Education Spending per Student., Source: Our own calculation
using Public Education Spending as a percentage of GDP, GDP PPP
(US $ current) and the population of the official age for education.
RST Public Pension Spending as percentage of GDP. Source: OECD (2015)
Social Expenditure-Aggregate data, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?
DataSetCode=SOCX AGG
RSPR Public Pensions Spending per Retiree. Source: Our own calculations
using Public Pension Spending as % of GDP,GDP PPP (US $ current)
and the number of people over 65 years old.
Plus55 Population over 55 years old as a proportion of the working age pop-
ulation (15-64). Source: OECD (2015) Demography and Population,
http://stats.oecd.org/#
ODR Old Dependency Ratio. Population over 65 years old as proportion of
the working age population (15-64). Source: OECD (2015) Demography
and Population, http://stats.oecd.org/#
PRODR Projected Old Dependency Ratio. Source: OECD (2015), http://stats.
oecd.org/ Historical population data and projections.
GDPpc GDP per capita PPP (US current $) Source: OECD (2015) https://
stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=60702#
GDP Growth In section 3: Growth of real GDP, percentage change from previous
year. Source: Armingeon (2012) http://www.cpds-data.org/ In sec-
tions 4,5 and 6: GDP growth (annual %) Source: World Bank (2015),
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/
Interest rate Long-term interest rate on government bonds. Source: Armingeon
(2012) http://www.cpds-data.org/
Openc Openness of the economy, measured as total trade (sum of imports and
exports) as a percentage of GDP, in current prices. Source: Armingeon
(2012) http://www.cpds-data.org/
Unemp Unemployment rate as a percentage of civilian labour force. Source:
Armingeon (2012) http://www.cpds-data.org/
Union Density Ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members, divided
by the total number of wage and salary earners. Source: OECD (2015),
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN DEN
G.T. Type of Government. Source: Armingeon (2012) http://www.cpds-data.
org/
G.P. Cabinet composition (Schmidt-Index). Ideology of the government
parties(-ies). Source: Armingeon (2012) http://www.cpds-data.org/
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Table 11 (continuation): Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition and Sources
Tax Revenue Tax revenue as % of GDP. Source: OECD (2015), http://stats.oecd.org/
viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=REV&lang=en#
TotSocExp Total Social Expenditure. Source: OECD (2015) Social Expenditure-
Aggregate data, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=
SOCX AGG
M.Y.S. Mean years of schooling. Source: UN (2014), http://hdr.undp.org/en/
dataviz-competition
Left Dummy variable for Left ideology of the government. Source: Armin-
geon (2012).
G.I. Globalization Index. Source: KOF, ETH Zurich, http://globalization.
kof.ethz.ch/
V.A.I. Voice and Accountability Index. Source: Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors (WGI) project, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.
aspx#home
E.F.I. Economic Freedom Index. Source: Heritage Foundation Research Insti-
tute/Wall Street Journal, http://www.heritage.org/index/
PopEduc Population of the official age for education in total population.
Source: UNESCO (2015) Education, http://data.uis.unesco.org/Index.
aspx?DataSetCode=EDULIT DS
Fertility Fertility rate. Source: OECD (2015) Demography, https://data.oecd.
org/pop/fertility-rates.htm
PPES Education spending by level of education as percentage of GDP, pre-
primary (PPES), primary (PES), secondary (SES) and tertiary (TES).
Source: UNESCO (2015), http://data.uis.unesco.org/?queryid=181
ppoap Population of the official age for education in total population by level of
education, pre-primary (ppoap), primary (poap), secondary (soap) and
tertiary (toap). Source: UNESCO (2015), http://data.uis.unesco.org/
?queryid=181
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